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 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Approximately 6.000.000 million Jews were murdered by the Hitler-regime in 
Europe during World War II. The international community said never again. An estimated 
2.000.000 million people were killed by Pol Pots regime in Kampuchea between 1975 and 
1979. The international community said never again. In spring 1994, an estimated 
1.000.000 million individuals were slaughtered by two Hutu militias in Rwanda. The 
international community said never again. In July 1995, an estimated 8.000 Bosnian boys 
and men, in the region of Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina were killed by units of the 
Army of the Serbian Republic. The international community said never again. Now, in 
2008, 400.000 thousand people have so far been massacred by the Janjaweed-militia in 
Sudan. How many times must the international community say never again?  
 
These are some very few examples of how some governments have failed to protect 
their populations from atrocities in the 20th century. If the international community, 
especially the United Nations, had reacted before the conflict escalated into genocide, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, the damages to the people and the country 
would be much less. If I was to write about all the genocides performed by governments 
and militias around the world in the past century, I would not be able to write about 
anything else, because the history unfortunately paints a dark picture of mankind. The 
consequences of these conflicts are astronomical. Not only do people get killed, they are 
also raped, displaced, starved and tortured. Wives become widows, children become 
orphans and the circle continues for years after the conflict has ended. The United Nations 
has not been able to prevent such atrocities from happening, even though they work for 
peace and mutual understanding and almost all countries in the world are members.  
 
 2 
 When a country’s population faces atrocities such as genocide, ethnic cleansing or 
crimes against humanity and the country in question is unable or unwilling to stop the 
atrocities, it is not always enough for the international community to sanction or boycott 
that country. If all other means are tried, and the suffering is still going on, sometimes the 
only means possible to end human suffering is through armed intervention. According to 
the 1945 Charter of the United Nations (hereafter the UN Charter) Chapter VII, armed 
intervention is only legal if the Security Council authorizes it or if it is in self-defense. 
Unfortunately, the Security Council has not reacted promptly to some of the biggest 
genocides in the last century, and my question is therefore: what can the international 
community do when the Security Council fails to take action towards a country that 
commits atrocities such as genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity to its 
own citizens? In other words, when all means have been tried, and the atrocities are still 
going on, can the international community take collective action and intervene unilaterally 
in that country if the Security Council fails to address this problem?  
 
I will study a newly developed term called the “Responsibility to Protect” (hereafter 
R2P). R2P consists of three different pillars: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility 
to react and the responsibility to rebuild. This thesis will focus on the pillar regarding the 
responsibility to react (hereafter R2R). 
 
The topic of this thesis is difficult, both legally and morally. The focus of this thesis 
is: Has the doctrine of R2P, and especially the pillar of R2R, lead to a change in how the 
international community views the prohibition on the use of force? In other words, has the 
development of R2P and especially R2R lead to a less absolute provision regarding the 
prohibition on the use of force? Is there a development in which interventions for human 
protection purposes has become legal? This is the core of this thesis. In this thesis I will 
examine four different problem sets:  
 
1. Has the pillar of “responsibility to react” become customary international law? 
2. Has the UN Charter’s Article 2(4) become desuetude? 
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3. Is it possible to reinterpret the UN Charter’s Article 2(4)? 
4. Has the pillar of “responsibility to react” changed the way the Security Council 
view the prohibition on the use of force? 
 
In the next chapter I will discuss the legal sources that I use in this thesis, such as 
treaties, judicial decisions, customary international law and declarations and 
resolutions. In chapter 3, I will examine the different legal aspects of this thesis such as 
state sovereignty, the prohibition on the use of force and the possible exceptions to this 
rule such as humanitarian intervention. Chapter 4 is the main part of this thesis and in 
this part I will examine the problems that I mentioned above. At last, in chapter 5, I 
will come to a conclusion and end the thesis with some le lege ferenda views.    
2 THE LEGAL SOURCES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The legal sources of public international law are mostly listed in the 1945 Statute of 
the International Court of Justice (hereafter the ICJ Statute) Article 38 (1). The sources that 
are listed in the ICJ Statute Article 38 (1) are: international conventions, international 
custom, general principles of law, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations. This list is not exhaustive, so other sources may 
be applied as well. In this chapter I will only examine the sources that I use in this thesis. 
The sources that I use according to the ICJ Statute Article 38 (1) are treaties, customary 
international law, judicial decisions and legal theory. I will also examine resolutions and 
declarations by the Security Council and the United Nations.   
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The ICJ Statute Article 38 (1) is an important provision because it is considered to 
be a general rule of what the legal sources are in public international law. It is not only 
applicable to the International Court of Justice, but also to all states. In other words, the 
rules put down in the ICJ Statute Article 38 (1) are considered customary international law. 
 
 
2.2 LEGAL SOURCES 
 
 
2.2.1 Treaties 
 
 According to the ICJ Statute Article 38 (1) (a), international conventions are a legal 
source in public international law. Conventions and treaties are the same name for the same 
thing, and I will use the term treaty in this thesis. A treaty1 is a quasi-contractual written 
instrument entered into by two or more states and registered with a third party, usually the 
United Nations Secretary-General. 
 
There is one type of treaty that can be regarded as a source of international law2: the 
law-making treaty. The law-making treaty is defined as a treaty concluded among a number 
of countries acting in their best interest, intended to create a new rule and adherent to later 
by other states, either through formal action in accordance with the provisions of the treaty 
or by tacit acquiescense in and observance of the new rule. This thesis will focus on the UN 
Charter due to its provisions regarding the prohibition on the use of force. 
 
Treaties are considered a major source of international law, and it is usually 
regarded as the most important of all the legal sources. When states ratify a treaty, the 
                                                
1 “Humanitarian Intervention” by Holzgrefe and Keohane pg. 179 (2003) 
2 “Law among nations 7th Edition” by Gerhard Von Glahn pg. 10 (1996) 
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treaty creates rights and duties upon the signing state. If a state breaches some of the 
provisions put down in the ratified treaty, consequences such as economic sanctions, 
boycotts and the use of military force may occur. 
 
2.2.2 Customary international law 
 
2.2.2.1 The traditional definition of customary international law 
Customary international law3 is based on natural law, in the belief that the 
principles contained therein are universal and undisputable. The vast majority of the 
world's governments accept in principle the existence of customary international law, 
although there are many differing opinions as to what rules are contained in it. There are 
also some scholars who claim that customary international law is not even a binding legal 
source. This discussion will be further analyzed below in part 2.2.2.3.       
According to the ICJ Statute Article 38 (1) (b), customary international law is a 
legal source in public international law. The traditional definition4 of customary 
international law is strictly doctrinal, in the sense that a particular norm is said to be a rule 
of customary international law if it satisfies a two-part doctrinal test. The most commonly 
cited version of this definition is provided by ICJ Article 38 (1) (b), which defines 
customary international law as “international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law”.  
Customary international law5 consists of rules of law derived from the consistent 
conduct of states acting out of the belief that the law required them to act that way. The 
principle element of customary law is the actual conduct of the states. If there is a 
widespread acceptance of the view that such conduct is in conformity with the law and is 
                                                
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Customary_international_law 
4 “How International Law Works” by Andrew T. Guzman pg. 184-185 (2008) 
5 “Practice and Methods of International Law” by Shabtai Rosenne pg. 55-56 (1984) 
 6 
required by the law, it will be considered to be a “general practice accepted as law”. A legal 
custom6 has come into being when it can be demonstrated that states act or fail to act in a 
certain way because a sense of legally binding obligation has developed.  
 
2.2.2.2 The conditions for customary international law  
 
  In order for a principle to become customary international law, the ICJ Statute 
Article 38 (1) (b) requires two conditions to be fulfilled. First, the principle needs to be a 
general state practice. Second, the principle needs to be accepted as law by states (also 
called opinio juris). 
 
I will first analyze the condition called general state practice7. Every state has a 
right to start a general state practice, whether it starts as national legislation, judicial 
decisions, protests against other states etc. In order for a principle to become customary 
international law, it needs widespread acceptance by many states. It also needs to have 
been developed over some time, but it is not a strict condition. The result is that when many 
states have the same general practice regarding a principle, it will become general state 
practice. When a principle has reached such status states can be bound either through its 
actions (estoppel) or its non-actions (acquiescence).  
 
A good example8 of such general state practice is that of Belgium’s argument 
during the Kosovo War in 1999. During NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, Belgium 
stated that the bombing was a case of humanitarian intervention. This argument is an 
example of general state practice that helps build a customary right. Throughout its 
argument Belgium acknowledges the developing nature of the idea of humanitarian 
intervention. Belgium’s argument is in itself general state practice, and it would have been 
                                                
6 “Law among nations 7th Edition” by Gerhard Von Glahn pg. 14 (1996) 
7 “Humanitarian Intervention” by Holzgrefe and Keohane pg. 179 (2003) 
8 “Customary international law on the use of force” by Cannizzaro and Palchetti pg. 15 (2005) 
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even though it did not participate in the bombings. If Belgium’s argument was 
acknowledged by many other states, it would become customary international law. 
  
The second condition is that the principle needs to be accepted as law by states 
(opinio juris)9. Opinio juris is a belief in a legal obligation. If the general state practice has 
become so widespread that most states agree upon it, the other states that do not practice 
this principle would feel obligated to conduct in accordance with that principle. In other 
words, the other states act in a certain way because they feel required to do so. When the 
general state practice has achieved this status, it will also be accepted by law (opinio juris). 
 
Opinio juris is a belief in a legal obligation. Some controversy10 prevails among international 
lawyers regarding what types of evidence are appropriate for demonstrating such a belief. Those who wish to 
emphasize the weaknesses of international law can easily look to this controversy over custom to demonstrate 
the level of uncertainty that exists among international law scholars on such vital questions. These critics, 
however, seems to loose sight of the reality that courts and nations are well able to take positions on 
customary law. The reality is that international judges and government officials find and evaluate evidence of 
practice and opinio juris with regularity and little theoretical difficulty. This is stated by the International 
Court of Justice both in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases11 and the Nicaragua Case12. 
 
The issue that is the most controversial13 among scholars today is if only physical 
acts count as state practice in the formation of custom or if also verbal acts counts as well. 
In the 1980s the vast majority of scholars, governments and the ICJ included both types of 
acts when determining evidence of practice. Today it still remains as the dominant view, 
but there have been some scholars to advocate otherwise. Anthea Roberts revived the 
traditional point of this view in an article in the American Journal of International Law. She 
wrote that the traditional view had the better argument in part because of the difficulty of 
assessing verbal acts for evidence of opinio juris. Roberts rejects the right to find opinio 
juris in practice derived from statements rather than physical acts. She says the statements 
themselves may contain opinio juris that is reflective of both de lege lata and de lege 
ferenda. Her concern is that a government statement of “this is the law” could be an attempt 
                                                
9 “Humanitarian Intervention” by Holzgrefe and Keohane pg. 179 (2003) 
10 “Customary international law on the use of force” by Cannizzaro and Palchetti pg. 14 (2005) 
11 Federal Republic of Germany v. the Netherlands, Judgment of February 20th 1969 
12 Nicaragua v. United States of America, Judgment of June 27th 1986  
13 “Customary international law on the use of force” by Cannizzaro and Palchetti pg. 14-15 (2005) 
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by a government to create new law, rather than a statement about of belief about existing 
law. She argues that physical acts will reflect what the state actually believes is the law. 
According to Mary Ellen O’Connell14 who wrote an article in the book “Customary 
international law on the use of force”, physical acts without any verbal statement give only 
an implicit indication of the states opinio juris. It cannot be assumed that the implication of 
states physical acts is a belief that the act is unlawful. Whether verbal of physical acts, all 
indications of a states opinio juris must be carefully assessed to develop a new rule. 
O’Connell furthermore states that if a country takes a clear stand on an issue, it will 
constitute state practice. One example she mentions is when Belgium argued before the 
International Court of Justice during NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 that the 
bombing was a case of humanitarian intervention.  
The reason why this is relevant is because it is necessary to find out exactly what 
opinio juris is. That is why it is important to discuss the different opinions about this 
condition. It is also important in the sense that I will later in the thesis discuss if the pillar 
of R2R has become customary international law and I therefore need the best definition on 
opinio juris. 
The judge, official or scholar must analyze all practice, verbal of physical, for 
indications of opinio juris. However, verbal acts generally provide explicit evidence of 
opinio juris unlike physical acts15. Actors often express as part of the verbal act their beliefs 
regarding what the law is. Physical acts can only give an implicit indication of opinio juris. 
This is also stated in the Lotus Case and the North Sea Continental Shelf Case. These 
decisions required explicit evidence of opinio juris to find if a rule of custom had in fact 
crystallized in the place of a prior rule. Therefore, explicit evidence of opinio juris is 
essential in some cases and will typically be found in verbal acts. 
   
                                                
14 “Customary international law on the use of force” by Cannizzaro and Palchetti pg. 14-15 (2005) 
15 “Customary international law on the use of force” by Cannizzaro and Palchetti pg. 16 (2005) 
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2.2.2.3 Criticism of customary international law 
There are some scholars that claim that customary international law is not considered a legal source. 
The reasoning16 behind this is that some scholars seem to argue that customary international law can be 
overridden due to extreme circumstances such as the interventions in Yugoslavia and Iraq. There is a 
widespread misperception that the law governing the prohibition on the use of force is weak or non-existent. 
Several scholars, in particular American scholars, have pointed out that the United States and other NATO 
members were free to use force against Yugoslavia and Iraq because no viable rules exists to prohibit such 
force and the institutions to implement the rules do not function properly. 
Some scholars argue17 that the use of force against such as Yugoslavia and Iraq should be judged by 
a higher standard than the law, in particular, by morality. This argument ignores the fact that the rules on the 
use of force reflect the moral beliefs of the community that formed them. In addition to breaching the 
morality inherent in law compliance, when a national leader decides to violate the international law rules 
against the use of force, he or she has decided that his or hers personal moral beliefs are superior to those of 
the community. Accepting such violations has the potential to break down rules because of their dependence 
on opinio juris. Scholars who care about viable rules against the use of force also play a role in the 
preservation or destruction of rules to the extent their characterizations of violations influence governments. 
Care in characterizing an act as a violation by looking to the standards of law can help preserve legal rules. 
Even though some scholars argue that customary international law cannot be considered a legal 
source, it is clear that such a source do exist. First of all, it is stated in the ICJ Statute Article 38 (1) (b), which 
most states in the world have ratified, that customary international law is considered a legal source. Secondly, 
the United Nations acknowledges customary international law to be a legal source. And at last, decisions 
carried out by the International Court of Justice are being followed which again shows that states feel 
obligated to respond to the verdict. With that said, customary international law remains as the most difficult 
of the legal sources due its uncertainty. When examining a principle who is starting to become customary 
international law, one need to both take governments physical and verbal acts into account and to revive how 
many governments that actually do practice this principle accepted as law. 
 
2.2.3 Judicial decisions 
 
According to the ICJ Article 38 (1) (d), decisions made by courts and tribunals are 
the fourth source of public international law. It is considered18 to be an indirect and 
subsidiary source since the decisions of domestic courts do not even bind their own 
governments in their international relations: yet a given decision not only reflects the 
interpretation of other courts as to the existence or meaning of a rule of international law 
but also indicates what that rule is held to mean in the country in question at the time the 
decision is drafted.  
                                                
16 “Customary international law on the use of force” by Cannizzaro and Palchetti pg. 10-11 (2005) 
17 “Customary international law on the use of force” by Cannizzaro and Palchetti pg. 11-12 (2005) 
18 “Law among nations 7th Edition” by Gerhard Von Glahn pg. 18 (1996) 
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The decisions I use in this thesis are the ones relating to how customary 
international law has emerged, and what the conditions are for a principle to become 
customary international law. Those decisions are the Nicaragua Case and the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases.  
 
2.2.4 Resolutions and declarations 
 
Since no ratification is required, resolutions and declarations do not correspond to 
treaties in an orthodox sense19. Some states have regarded these resolutions as creating 
binding legal obligations. If such an interpretation can be shown to have been accepted by 
the participating states through their subsequent actions, then it has to be admitted that in 
the instances in question, regional law has been created.  
 
The types of resolutions that I use in this thesis are the ones issued by the Security 
Council in regards to the UN Charter Chapter VII and they relate to the conflict in Darfur. 
The reason why I chose to use these resolutions is because they refer to the doctrine of 
R2P.  
 
The types of declarations that I use in this thesis are the ones issued by the United 
Nations such as the report “A more secure world: Our shared responsibility” and the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document. The reason why I chose to use these documents is 
because they also refer to the doctrine of R2P. 
 
 
  
                                                
19 “Law among  nations 7th Edition” by Gerhard Von Glahn pg. 12 (1996) 
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2.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER SOURCES OF LAW 
 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis contains many different legal sources and in this part I will discuss the 
relationship between them. The legal sources that I use the most are: treaties such as the 
UN Charter, customary international law, documents by the United Nations such as 
Security Council resolutions and last reports and articles written by legal scholars. It is 
necessary to examine the relationship between these sources of law since they all have 
different ranks. In order for me to find out if unilateral intervention, without Security 
Council authorization is legal, I need to figure out which of these legal sources that will 
prevail in times of a conflict. 
 
2.3.2 The main rule 
 
The main rule in international law is that treaties are peremptory to all other sources 
of law. The relationship20 between the two principal sources of international law; treaties 
and customary international law, is similar to the relationship between domestic statutes 
and the common law. As between the parties to a treaty, an unambiguous provision of the 
treaty prevails over a conflicting rule of customary international law. One treaty, the UN 
Charter Article 103, even states explicitly that it prevails over all other treaties. This quasi-
constitutional instrument has since been ratified by 189 states. It is clear that treaties will 
always prevail over all other sources of law. 
 
                                                
20 “Humanitarian Intervention” by Holzgrefe and Keohane pg. 180 (2003) 
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One of the problems that I will examine in this thesis, is if other actors than the 
Security Council can unilaterally intervene in another country for human protection 
purposes. Since treaties will prevail when it conflicts with other sources of law, how can 
then customary international law outrank the UN Charter? This leads me to the question of 
jus cogens. 
 
Some non-treaty rules have a “peremptory” character21 and they have the ability to 
override conflicting, non-peremptory rules. According to the 1969 Vienna Convention of 
the Law of Treaties Article 53:  
 
“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory 
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a 
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international 
law having the same character.”  
 
Peremptory rules include the prohibitions on genocide, torture and the aggressive 
use of force. Referred to as jus cogens, they are considered by most international lawyers to 
be customary in origin and thus a result of a process of development similar to that of 
customary international law. They therefore require the support of most, if not all, states, as 
expressed through their active or passive support, coupled with a sense of legal obligation. 
Given the public policy and peremptory character of these rules, the threshold for their 
development is necessary very high, higher than that for other customary rules. 
 
The prohibition on the use of force is, as mentioned, considered to be both 
customary international law and jus cogens. In the Nicaragua Case22, the International 
Court of Justice found that the UN Charter Article 2(4) had passed into customary 
                                                
21 “Humanitarian Intervention” by Holzgrefe and Keohane pg. 180 (2003) 
22 Nicaragua v. United States of America, Judgment of 27 June 1986, paras. 187 to 201 
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international law and also referred to it as jus cogens. That means that the prohibition on 
the use of force is not only illegal and unlawful according to the UN Charter, it is also 
prohibited according to customary international law. 
 
So, in order for other actors than the Security Council to unilaterally intervene in a 
country for human protection purposes, any such right23 could have effect only if it 
achieved the status of both customary international law and jus cogens. I will analyze this 
problem later in this thesis. 
3 THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
According to the UN Charter Article 2(4), the main rule in international law is that no 
state can use force against another state. Later in this chapter I will analyze this prohibition 
closer. 
Since this thesis regards a state’s intervention in another state, I think it is highly 
relevant to shortly write about what state sovereignty is and if states have an absolute 
sovereignty over their domestic affairs. Then I will discuss the prohibition on the use of 
force as it is put down in the UN Charter Article 2(4) and the exceptions that follow. 
   
                                                
23 “War Law” by Michael Byers pg. 100 (2005) 
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3.2 STATE SOVEREIGNTY  
 
The main rule in international law is that each state is sovereign. This is also 
expressively stated in the UN Charter Article 2(1):  
 
“The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”  
 
The term “state sovereignty”24 is put together by two separate terms: ”territorial 
state” and “sovereignty”. A “territorial state” is considered as a geographically contained 
structure whose agents claim ultimate political authority within their domain. 
“Sovereignty” is regarded as a political entity whose agents have externally been 
recognized the right to exercise final authority over its affairs. State sovereignty is an 
inherently social construct. The modern state system is not based on some timeless 
principle of sovereignty, but on the production of a normative conception which links 
authority, territory, population and recognition in a unique way and in a particular state.  
 
Since the Peace of Westphalia sovereignty has been the main rule in international 
law, but is “absolute sovereignty” the main rule, or are we moving towards “conditional 
sovereignty”? It is argued by scholars25 that the idea of sovereign power has been eroded 
by the economic and informational processes known as “globalization” and by the 
development of cosmopolitan political processes associated with bodies such as the United 
Nations and the various global NGOs. Moreover, the concept has always been flawed 
insofar as it left citizens at the mercy of their governments, with frequently alarming 
consequences.  
 
The defense of state sovereignty26, by even its strongest supporters, does not 
include any claim of the unlimited power of a state to do what it wants to its own people. 
                                                
24 “State Sovereignty as Social Construct” by Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber pg. 2 (2006) 
25 “The ethics of armed humanitarian intervention” by Tony Coady pg. 21  
26 “The Responsibility to Protect” by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty pg. 
8 (2001) 
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The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (hereafter the ICISS) 
found no such claim at any stage during their worldwide consultations for their report 
“Responsibility to Protect”. It is acknowledged that sovereignty implies a dual 
responsibility: externally, to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to 
respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state. In international human 
rights covenants, in UN practice, and in state practice itself, sovereignty is now understood 
as embracing this dual responsibility. Sovereignty as responsibility has become the 
minimum content of good international citizenship. This modern understanding of the 
meaning of sovereignty is of central importance in the ICISS’s approach to the question of 
intervention for human protection purposes, and in particular in the development of their 
core theme, “the responsibility to protect”. 
 
To support this argument, Kofi Annan stated that:27  
 
“…States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their 
peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty - by which I mean the 
fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the Charter of the UN and 
subsequent international treaties - has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading 
consciousness of individual rights. When we read the Charter today, we are more than ever 
conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse 
them”. 
 
In today’s society, where human rights have become so important, one can claim 
that a state has only the inherent right of “conditional sovereignty”. In other words, the 
safebeing of individuals are more important than an absolute sovereignty for governments. 
The state must therefore be regarded as having “conditional sovereignty,” that is, 
sovereignty that is conditional on some minimal level of discharge of obligations to respect 
the human rights of its citizens. 
 
                                                
27 “Two Concepts of Sovereignty” by Kofi Annan in the Economist, Sept. 18, 1999. 
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3.3 THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE 
 
3.3.1 The main rule 
 
Adopted in the wake of World War II and proclaiming the determination “to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” the UN Charter established a prohibition 
on the use of force to resolve disputes among states. The main rule in international law is 
therefore that no state can intervene in another state. This is explicitly spelled out in the UN 
Charter Article 2(4):  
 
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”  
 
According to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties Article 31(1), 
treaties shall be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the treaty and in the 
light of its object and purpose. The ordinary meaning of the UN Charter Article 2(4) is 
clear: the use of force across state borders is simply not permitted. This meaning is 
furthermore supported by the UN Charter’s context, objective and purpose.  
 
The prohibition on the use of force is also considered to be both customary 
international law and jus cogens. In the Nicaragua Case28, the International Court of Justice 
found that the UN Charter Article 2(4) had passed into customary international law and 
also referred to it as jus cogens. That means that the prohibition on the use of force is not 
only illegal and unlawful according to the UN Charter, it is also prohibited according to 
customary international law. 
 
                                                
28 Nicaragua v. United States of America, Judgment of 27 June 1986, paras. 187 to 201 
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3.3.2 The written exceptions from the prohibition on the use of force  
 
The UN Charter sets out, however, two exceptions to the Article 2(4) prohibition on 
the use of force. The first exception to the UN Charter Article 2(4) prohibition is that the 
Security Council may authorize the use of force if it does so explicitly through a resolution 
adopted under the UN Charter Chapter VII. According to the UN Charter Article 39: 
 
“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.”  
 
The UN Charter Article 42 clearly states that if a state breaches the prohibitions 
mentioned in Article 39: 
 
“…the Security Council may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security...”  
 
No such authorization29 by the Security Council has been made for humanitarian 
reasons. The few interventions that might have been justified on humanitarian grounds - 
Bangladesh, Cambodia and Uganda - were all justified on other terms, while the 
interventions in Liberia, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti and Rwanda were conducted on the basis 
of Security Council authorizations, and in some cases also at the invitation of the targeted 
state.  
 
The second exception to the UN Charter Article 2(4) prohibition is the right of 
independent or collective self-defense. According to the UN Charter Article 51:  
 
                                                
29 “Humanitarian Intervention” by Holzgrefe and Keohane pg. 183 (2003) 
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“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, 
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority 
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time 
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”  
 
This right30 is contingent upon an armed attack on the state asserting the right, and 
limited to acts taken in self-defense that are both necessary and proportionate. Examples of 
such self-defense are the 1991 Gulf War, and more recently, the 2001 Afghanistan War. In 
the first example Iraq invaded Kuwait, and when Kuwait asked the international 
community for help, the United Nations responded. Allied forces got together, helped 
Kuwait and ended the illegal occupation. In the second example, the United States was the 
victim of a terror attack, and according to their intelligence, the terrorist group which 
conducted the atrocity where stationed in Afghanistan, and so the United States went to war 
against Afghanistan as a pre-emptive self-defense. This doctrine however is highly 
disputed and it is still unclear in the legal environment if the war in Afghanistan was lawful 
or not. 
 
Other regional coalitions than the United Nations forces, such as NATO and the 
African Union, may also intervene in a country that is a danger to world peace, but again 
such a regional coalition needs authorization by the Security Council. According to the UN 
Charter Article 53:  
 
“…no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional 
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council…” 
 
                                                
30 “Humanitarian Intervention” by Holzgrefe and Keohane pg. 182-183 (2003) 
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With that said, the UN Charter leaves no room for an exception to the prohibition 
on the use of force, other than the ones I mentioned. The key element is that all 
interventions must have the authorization by the Security Council. If they do not, they are 
considered illegal and unlawful. But is it possible that other exceptions have emerged in 
customary international law? I will write about that in the next part. 
 
3.3.3 Are there any unwritten exceptions from the prohibition on the use of force?  
 
3.3.3.1 Pro-democratic intervention 
 
The first exception that may have developed in recent time31 is called pro-
democratic intervention, and it is a right to intervene military in another state to promote or 
restore democracy. There are however, no credible precedents for the claim of pro-
democratic intervention. In the absence of precedents, there is no supporting state practice 
or opinio juris and, therefore, no possible rule of customary law. The UN Security Council 
could authorize an intervention for the purposes of supporting or restoring democracy, 
since that is their legal right after the UN Charter Chapter VII, but individual countries 
cannot legally take such action on their own.  
 
3.3.3.2 Humanitarian intervention 
 
Humanitarian intervention is a principle which consists of three different terms: 
intervention, armed intervention and humanitarian intervention. The general term 
intervention is usually defined32 as the exercise of authority by one state within the 
jurisdiction of another state, but without its permission. If the state uses force against 
                                                
31 “War Law” by Michael Byers pg. 85 (2005) 
32 “Humanitarian Intervention” by Nardin and Williams pg. 1 (2006) 
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another state, it is called an armed intervention. An armed intervention is humanitarian 
when it aims to protect innocent people who are not nationals of the intervening state from 
violence perpetrated or permitted by the government of the target state. In other words, a 
humanitarian intervention33 is the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or 
group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the 
fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission 
of the state within whose territory force is applied. 
There are two types of humanitarian interventions34: unilateral humanitarian 
intervention and multilateral humanitarian intervention. Unilateral humanitarian 
intervention is when the intervention is not authorized by the Security Council, and 
multilateral humanitarian intervention is when the intervention is authorized by the 
Security Council. In modern times there have been no multilateral interventions, only 
unilateral interventions such as the Kosovo War in 1999.  
Legal scholars have disagreed about the term humanitarian intervention since its 
origin35. Some people regard humanitarian intervention as an oxymoron. How can military 
intervention ever be humanitarian? Others are so suspicious of the intentions of powerful 
governments that they reach the same conclusion: that humanitarian intervention should be 
outlawed. Then you have those who advocate that it is an ethical responsibility to protect 
individuals from massive human rights breaches, and humanitarian intervention is therefore 
the only measure possible to end it. To this day, the right of humanitarian intervention is 
highly controversial.  
 
 
 
                                                
33 “Humanitarian Intervention” by Holzgrefe and Keohane pg. 18 (2003) 
34 “War Law” by Michael Byers pg. 9 (2005) 
35 “Humanitarian Intervention” Holzgrefe and Keohane pg. 1 (2003) 
 21 
3.4 THE WAY FORWARD 
 
 
The next chapter is divided into five different parts. I will start by introducing the 
doctrine R2P as it is set out in the report “Responsibility to Protect” by the ICISS. There 
are two reasons why I want to start to write about this report. The first reason is that this 
report launched a new idea, an idea that a state has the primarily responsibility to protect its 
citizens from massive human rights violations, and if that state is unwilling or unable to 
stop it, the international community can, as a last resort, intervene in that state with armed 
forces. The other reason is that the main principles of this report were acknowledged by the 
United Nations in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and by the Security 
Council in recent resolutions regarding the conflict in Sudan.  In part 4.3, I will examine 
the pillar of R2R and the principles contained therein. I will also analyze the different 
criteria in order for an armed intervention to be legal. 
 
In part 4.3, I will determine if the pillar of R2R has become customary international 
law. I want to find out if R2R has become a doctrine which legalizes the use of unilateral 
intervention for human protection purposes. I will mainly take into consideration state 
practice and opinio juris of governments, but I will also write about what legal scholars 
have uttered about this topic. In part 4.4, I will discuss if the UN Charter Article 2(4) 
prohibition on the use of force has become desuetude. This is due to the many breaches of 
this prohibition. My task is to find out if the prohibition on the use of force is absolute or if 
there is a tendency of a more moderate prohibition on the use of force.  
 
In part 4.5, I will also discuss if it is possible to reinterpret the UN Charter Article 
2(4) and if it is possible to invoke moral norms when considering intervening in a country 
for human protection purposes. At last, in part 4.6, I will discuss the role of the Security 
Council. I will focus on the composition of the Security Council, the veto right enjoyed by 
the five permanent member states and the Security Council’s responsibility to react to 
grave human crisis. 
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4 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE PILLAR OF THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO REACT 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This chapter is divided into five different parts. First, I will introduce the doctrine of 
R2P and discuss the development of R2P. Second, I will introduce the pillar of R2R and 
analyze when it is appropriate to use force across borders. Third, I will discuss if the pillar 
of R2R has become customary international law. I need to examine if both conditions 
regarding state practice and opinio juris are fulfilled. Fourth, I will investigate if the 
prohibition on the use of force as it is put down in the UN Charter Article 2 (4) has become 
desuetude or if it is possible to reinterpret it. At last, I will discuss the role of the Security 
Council.  
 
 
4.2 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT  
 
4.2.1 How R2P got started 
 
The doctrine of R2P developed after the Kosovo war in 1999. After a decade with 
massive human rights violations on both sides, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) intervened. This intervention was considered to be a unilateral humanitarian 
intervention, and since the intervention did not have the authorization of the Security 
Council it was considered to be unlawful. Since the international community witnessed so 
many devastating wars after the formation of the United Nations, and since it seemed 
difficult for the Security Council to authorize interventions based on humanitarian grounds, 
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the international community wanted to investigate what they could do about this matter to 
prevent future human suffering.  
 
It was in response to this challenge that the Canadian government, together with a 
group of major foundations, announced at the United Nations General Assembly in 
September 2000 the establishment of the ICISS. The Commission was asked to deal with 
the whole range of questions regarding humanitarian intervention – legal, moral, 
operational and political – and to bring back a report that would help the Secretary-General 
and everyone else find some new common ground. The resulting report “Responsibility to 
Protect” concluded that36:  
 
“…state sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the 
protection of its people lies with the state itself. Where a population is suffering serious 
harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in 
question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to 
the international responsibility to protect…” 
 
This statement is the core of the doctrine of R2P. The ICISS claims that human 
rights have achieved such high status in international law that the human rights charters 
will prevail over state sovereignty in case of conflict. The report furthermore states that: 
 
“Thinking of sovereignty as responsibility, in a way that is being increasingly 
recognized in state practice, has a threefold significance. First, it implies that the state 
authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens 
and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that the national political authorities 
are responsible to the citizens internally and to the international community through the 
UN. And thirdly, it means that the agents of state are responsible for their actions; that is to 
say, they are accountable for their acts of commission and omission. The case for thinking 
                                                
36 “The Responsibility to Protect” by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(2001) 
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of sovereignty in these terms is strengthened by the ever-increasing impact of international 
human rights norms, and the increasing impact in international discourse of the concept of 
human security.” 
 
According to the report, military intervention from external actors may therefore be 
legitimate, as a last resort, even though the Security Council has not authorized the 
intervention. The interventions the report is mentioning, is the unilateral interventions for 
humanitarian purposes. The doctrine of R2P37 embraces three specific responsibilities:  
 
“…First the responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and direct 
causes of internal conflicts and other man-made crises putting populations at risk. Second, 
the responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need with 
appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and 
international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention. Third, the 
responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance 
with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the 
intervention was designed to halt or avert…” 
 
4.2.2 How R2P got acknowledged as an international doctrine 
 
The report met massive criticism from actors in the international community, but 
three years later, in 2004, the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change confirmed this report in their document “A More Secure World: 
Our Shared Responsibility”. This document stated that38: 
 
                                                
37 “The Responsibility to Protect” by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(2001) 
38“A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility” by the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) 
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“…The concept of state sovereignty clearly carries with it the obligation of a state 
to protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international 
community…and that, in circumstances where the state is not able or willing to fulfill this 
responsibility, the principles of collective security mean that some portion of those 
responsibilities should be taken up by the international community…” 
 
In 2005, member states unanimously embraced the responsibility to protect 
populations in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document at the United Nations General 
Assembly. This document39 concluded that: 
 
 “…Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility 
entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and 
necessary means…” 
 
The document also mentions that if all peaceful means have been exhausted, the 
Security Council will resort to the use of force:  
 
“…In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter 
VII, on a case-by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly 
failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity…” 
 
The Security Council has also acknowledged R2P in recent resolutions regarding 
the genocide in Sudan. On April 28th 2006, the Security Council passed Resolution 167440 
and invoked the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
                                                
39 “2005 World Summit Outcome Document” by the United Nations pg. 31 
40 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1674 of April 28th 2006 
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Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. On April 30th 2007, the Security Council 
passed Resolution 175541, and the resolution reaffirms the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document and Resolution 1674. 
The Security Council acknowledged on December 11th 2007 the creation of the 
position of Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect42. This position is part-time 
and at the level of Assistant Secretary General. On February 21st 2008 the Spokesperson for 
Secretary General announced that Edward Luck was appointed as Special Adviser, with a 
focus on the Responsibility to Protect, as set out by the General Assembly in paragraphs 
138 and 139 of the Outcome Document. Mr. Luck’s primary role will be to develop 
conceptual clarity and consensus for the evolving norm. 
On February 14th 2008, a Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect43 was 
established at the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies of the City University of 
New York’s Graduate Center. Its mission is to promote and catalyze international action to 
help countries to prevent or halt mass atrocities.  
 
Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), welcomed the launch in New York of the Global Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect. He stated that the European Union welcomes the launch of the 
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. The Centre will help to ensure that the 
concept of the Responsibility to Protect, which was adopted at the 2005 World Summit, is 
further developed and applied by the international community. This means that all the 
countries within the EU have all agreed upon the term responsibility to protect. The 
European Union is composed of 27 independent sovereign countries which are known as 
member states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
                                                
41 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1755 of April 30th 2007 
42 http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org 
43 http://www.globalcentrer2p.org 
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Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
 
 
4.3 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO REACT 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
The doctrine of R2P consists of three different pillars: The responsibility to prevent, 
the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild. My thesis will focus on the 
pillar regarding the responsibility to react. In this part I will introduce the content of this 
pillar and the criteria that need to be fulfilled before an armed intervention for human 
protection purposes can take place.  
 
According to the report “Responsibility to Protect” by the ICISS there is an 
international responsibility to protect populations at risk, and the ICISS44 has argued that it 
extends to a responsibility to react by appropriate means if a catastrophe is occurring, or 
seems imminent. In extreme cases, that responsibility to react includes military intervention 
within a state, to carry out that human protection. The threshold for intervening is tough, 
and several precautionary criteria must be satisfied before intervening for human protection 
purposes. The criteria have to be tough, because the action proposed is itself extreme: 
military intervention means not only an intrusion into a sovereign state, but an intrusion 
involving the use of deadly force, on a potentially massive scale.  
 
The report states that45:  
 
                                                
44 “The Responsibility to Protect” by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty pg. 
47 (2001) 
45 “The Responsibility to Protect” by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty pg. 
31 (2001) 
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“…In extreme and exceptional cases, the responsibility to react may involve the 
need to resort to military action…” 
 
 But what is an extreme case? Where should we draw the line in determining when 
military intervention is defensible? 
 
The report concludes that46 there are six criteria that must be fulfilled before an 
armed intervention for human protection purposes can take place. These criteria are: right 
authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable 
prospects. I will only give a brief introduction about these criteria. To get a more 
thoroughly analysis on this subject, I refer to the report “Responsibility to Protect” by the 
ICISS.  
 
4.3.2 Right authority 
 
The report states very clearly47 that the Security Council should be the first port of 
call on any matter relating to military intervention for human protection purposes. But what 
happens if the Security Council fails to act towards a humanitarian crisis? The report 
mentions two alternatives if the Security Council fails to act. One possible alternative 
would be to seek support for military action from the General Assembly meeting in an 
Emergency Special Session under the established “Uniting for Peace” procedures. The 
other alternative is that a regional or sub-regional organization acting within its defining 
boundaries collective group of countries can take action, such as NATO.  
 
                                                
46 “The Responsibility to Protect” by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty pg. 
32 (2001) 
47 “The Responsibility to Protect” by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty pg. 
52-54 (2001) 
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4.3.3 Just cause  
 
In the ICISS’s view48, military intervention for human protection purposes is 
justified in two broad sets of circumstances, namely in order to halt or avert: large scale 
loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either 
of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or 
large scale ethnic cleansing, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced 
expulsion, acts of terror or rape. If either or both of these conditions are satisfied, it is the 
ICISS’s view that the “just cause” component of the decision to intervene is amply 
satisfied. 
 
4.3.4 Right intention 
 
The primary purpose of the intervention49 must be to halt or avert human suffering. 
Any use of military force that aims from the outset, for example, for the alteration of 
borders or the advancement of a particular combatant group’s claim to self-determination, 
cannot be justified. Overthrow of regimes is not, as such, a legitimate objective, although 
disabling that regime’s capacity to harm its own people may be essential to discharging the 
mandate of protection – and what is necessary to achieve that disabling will vary from case 
to case. Occupation of territory may not be able to be avoided, but it should not be an 
objective as such, and there should be a clear commitment from the outset to returning the 
territory to its sovereign owner at the conclusion of hostilities or, if that is not possible, 
administering it on an interim basis under UN auspices. 
 
                                                
48 “The Responsibility to Protect” by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty pg. 
32 (2001) 
 
49 “The Responsibility to Protect” by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty pg. 
35 (2001) 
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4.3.5 Last resort 
 
Every diplomatic and non-military avenue for the prevention or peaceful resolution 
of the humanitarian crisis must have been explored50. The responsibility to react, with 
military coercion, can only be justified when the responsibility to prevent has been fully 
discharged. This does not necessarily mean that every such option must literally have been 
tried and failed: often there will simply not be the time for that process to work itself out. 
But it does mean that there must be reasonable grounds for believing that, in all the 
circumstances, if the measure had been attempted it would not have succeeded. 
 
4.3.6 Proportional means 
 
The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the 
minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in question51. The means have to 
be commensurate with the ends, and in line with the magnitude of the original provocation. 
The effect on the political system of the country targeted should be limited, again, to what 
is strictly necessary to accomplish the purpose of the intervention. While it may be a matter 
for argument in each case what are the precise practical implications of these strictures, the 
principles involved are clear enough. 
 
4.3.7 Reasonable prospects 
 
Military action can only be justified if it stands a reasonable chance of success52, 
that is, halting or averting the atrocities or suffering that triggered the intervention in the 
                                                
50 “The Responsibility to Protect” by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty pg. 
36 (2001) 
51 “The Responsibility to Protect” by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty pg. 
37 (2001) 
52 “The Responsibility to Protect” by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty pg. 
37 (2001) 
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first place. Military intervention is not justified if actual protection cannot be achieved, or if 
the consequences of embarking upon the intervention are likely to be worse than if there is 
no action at all. In particular, a military action for limited human protection purposes 
cannot be justified if in the process it triggers a larger conflict. It will be the case that some 
human beings simply cannot be rescued except at unacceptable cost – perhaps of a larger 
regional conflagration, involving major military powers. In such cases, however painful the 
reality, coercive military action is no longer justified. 
 
After a closer look at the doctrine of R2P and the pillar of R2R, one problem seems 
to arise: First, the report “Responsibility to Protect” by the ICISS concludes that in extreme 
circumstances, and if the Security Council is unable to issue an authorization for an armed 
intervention, a collective armed intervention may take place to end the human suffering. 
The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, however, concludes that an armed 
intervention can only take place after getting an authorization of the Security Council. I 
will therefore discuss the importance of the report by ICISS and find out if the pillar of 
R2R has become a legal exception from the prohibition on the use of force put down in the 
UN Charter Article 2 (4). 
 
 
4.4 HAS THE PILLAR OF “RESPONSIBILITY TO REACT” BECOME 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
 
Having determined that the UN Charter Article 2(4) clearly prohibits the use of 
force in any matter, one may ask whether a right to intervene on humanitarian grounds to 
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protect people from massive human rights violations such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, 
and crimes against humanity, has developed in customary international law. 
 
In this part I will try to find out if the right of unilateral intervention for R2P 
purposes is a legal exception to the prohibition on the use of force. In order to find out if 
R2R has become a legal exception to the prohibition on the use of force, I need to 
investigate if R2R has become customary international law. In order to find out if R2R has 
become customary international law, I need to examine if R2R fulfills the conditions for 
customary international law put down in the ICJ Statute Article 38 (1) (b). I will look at 
what governments have done to fulfill the conditions for state practice and opinio juris. If 
R2R fulfills these conditions, it has become customary in international law and therefore a 
legitimate and lawful exception from the prohibition on the use of force.  
 
4.4.2 Has the pillar of “responsibility to react” become “general state practice 
accepted as law”?  
 
In this part I will determine if R2R fulfills the conditions to become customary 
international law. But how will I determine whether or not governments agree upon the 
pillar of R2R? Do I need to find explicit evidence of either verbal or physical acts that 
states around the world practice the pillar of R2R and feel legally obligated to do so? I will 
discuss how many governments that have stated that they agree upon the pillar of R2R. 
Since there is a requirement of a widespread practice, it is a condition that many states have 
acknowledged R2R. Those states must also feel obligated to follow R2R. If R2R manage to 
fulfill these requirements, it will be considered customary international law.  
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4.4.3 State practice 
 
During NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, Belgium stated that the bombing 
was a case of humanitarian intervention53 and they supported the intervention even though 
it did not have the authorization of the Security Council. Belgium did therefore 
acknowledge a right of unilateral interventions for humanitarian purposes.  
In the aftermath of the 1999 Kosovo War, U.S. administration officials articulated a 
Clinton doctrine54 that proclaims that the United States will forcefully intervene to prevent 
human rights abuses when it can do so without suffering substantial casualties. This 
doctrine rhetorically suggests a new, assertive U.S. approach to promoting and defending 
human rights abroad. The United States have since then intervened with armed forces in 
both Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), without the explicit authorization by the Security 
Council. The United States claimed that the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were 
legal due to self-defense and the humanitarian crisis in these countries. The United States 
clearly acknowledge a right of unilateral interventions for humanitarian purposes. 
The United Kingdom is also one of the strongest advocates for a right to unilateral 
interventions for humanitarian purposes. They were the first country to acknowledge the 
2003 Iraqi intervention, and former Prime Minister Toy Blair said that55: 
 
“… We surely have a responsibility to act when a nation’s people are subjected to a 
regime such as Saddam’s...” 
 
In order for R2R to fulfill the condition regarding state practice, more than three 
governments need to acknowledge a right to unilateral intervention for humanitarian 
purposes. It is, however, very difficult to find governments that acknowledge such a right. 
The above mentioned countries represent rather the minority than the majority. It is clear 
                                                
53 “Customary international law on the use of force” by Cannizzaro and Palchetti pg. 15 (2005) 
54 “Humanitarian military intervention” by Jules Lobel and Michael Ratner in Foreign Policy, Number 5,        
Volume 1, January 2000 
55 “War Law” by Michael Byers pg. 107 (2005) 
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that the first condition regarding state practice in the ICJ Statute Article 38 (1) (b) is not 
fulfilled.  
 
There is one question, however, that I would like to address, and that is the 
importance of recent Security Council resolutions. The Security Council has recently 
endorsed the doctrine of R2P and the pillar of R2R in resolutions regarding the conflict in 
Sudan. Resolution 175556 reaffirmed the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
regarding R2P. The resolution concluded that states have a responsibility to protect its own 
citizens from mass atrocities, and if the states in question do not comply, the United 
Nations will take sufficient action. Since heads of governments are present during the 
voting of these resolutions, one can claim that this is an act of state practice. Even though 
these resolutions claim that only multilateral interventions for humanitarian purposes are 
legal, it shows that there is a development regarding interventions for human protection 
purposes. 
 
Regarding the conflict in Sudan, the Security Council has reached far as R2R is 
concerned. In 2004, the Security Council endorsed an African Union peacekeeping force, 
consisting of 150 troops, to protect Darfur civilians. By mid-2005 its number were 
increased to 7.000 troops. Since the conflict continued to escalate, the Security Council 
decided that the African Union troops were to be reinforced by a UN-led peacekeeping 
force, consisting of 17.300 troops57. However, the Sudanese President denied the force to 
be established, so the peacekeeping force did not arrive. In mid-July 2007 a unanimous 
Security Council58 authorized a deployment of a joint United Nations and African Union 
force, consisting of 26.000 troops. The members of the Security Council were at that time59 
the following countries: Belgium, China, Congo, France, Ghana, Indonesia, Italy, Panama, 
Peru, Qatar, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, the UK and the USA. This act 
shows that there is a new awareness regarding humanitarian crisis. 
                                                
56 The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1755 of April 30th 2007 
57 The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1706 of August 31st 2006 
58 The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 on July 31st 2007 
59 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N07/444/45/PDF/N0744445.pdf?OpenElement 
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4.4.4 Opinio juris  
 
There have been many wars and conflicts in the world since the formation of the 
United Nations, but there have been very few multilateral interventions for humanitarian 
purposes that have been authorized by the Security Council. It is therefore even more 
difficult to find examples of opinio juris regarding R2R, since R2R is a fairly new term; 
developed in 2001. Since my task in this thesis is to find out if the condition regarding 
opinio juris is fulfilled, I need to find examples of governments acting out of a legal 
obligation regarding R2R. In other words, are there many governments that feel legally 
obligated to follow the pillar of R2R? 
 
The answer to this question is not complicated. It is clear that such a legal 
obligation does not exist. Scholars have tried for years to make the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention a legal exception from the prohibition on the use of force, but 
they have been unsuccessful. The same applies to the doctrine of R2P. There have been no 
multilateral interventions for R2P purposes since the doctrine itself got introduced in 2001. 
 
The pillar of R2R has not reached the status of customary international law, but I 
want to discuss this problem a little further. As mentioned, there is a new awareness around 
human rights, and I will therefore find out if this awareness is also among legal scholars.  
 
4.4.5 Legal scholars that acknowledge the right of unilateral intervention for human 
protection purposes 
 
According to Alicia L. Bannon in the article “The Responsibility To Protect: The 
U.N. World Summit and the Question of Unilateralism”60 she argues that the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document strengthens the legal justification for limited forms of 
                                                
60 “The Responsibility To Protect: The U.N. World Summit and the Question of Unilateralism” by Alicia L. 
Bannon in Yale Law Journal, Number 5, Volume 115, March 2006  
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unilateral and regional action, including military action, if the United Nations fails to act to 
protect populations from genocide and other atrocities. The document strengthens the 
justification for unilateral action in two main ways. First, the document affirms important 
limits on national sovereignty by recognizing a state's responsibility to protect its own 
citizens. Second, the document sets clear responsibilities for the international community 
when a country fails to protect its own citizens. In cases of UN inaction, would-be 
unilateral actors can point to an explicit failure to fulfill a duty. However, the document 
only supports unilateral action in a narrow set of circumstances. First, the document is 
limited to a small set of extreme human rights abuses. Second, the document implies a 
hierarchy of actors and of interventions: Good faith UN action is privileged over 
unilateralism and peaceful action is privileged over violent means. Finally, the document 
limits the scope of intervention to the goal of protection.  
Other scholars just conclude that when it comes to Sudan, enough is enough. 
According to Susan E. Rice, Anthony Lake and Donald M. Payne, the time of negotiation, 
sanctions and boycotts are over. They stated that61:  
“After swift diplomatic consultations, the United States should press for a UN 
resolution that issues Sudan an ultimatum: accept unconditional deployment of the UN 
force within one week or face military consequences. The resolution would authorize 
enforcement by UN member states, collectively or individually. International military 
pressure would continue until Sudan relented…If the United States fails to gain UN 
support, we should act without it. Impossible? No, the United States acted without UN 
blessing in 1999 in Kosovo to confront a lesser humanitarian crisis (perhaps 10,000 killed) 
and a more formidable adversary. Under NATO auspices, it bombed Serbian targets until 
Slobodan Milosevic acquiesced. Not a single American died in combat. Many nations 
protested that the United States violated international law, but the United Nations 
subsequently deployed a mission to administer Kosovo and effectively blessed NATO 
military action retroactively…”  
                                                
61 “We saved Europeans. Why not Africans?” by Susan E. Rice, Anthony Lake and Donald M. Payne in 
Washington Post, Monday, October 2, 2006, Page A19 
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They also confirmed the responsibility to protect.  
“…Others will insist that, without the consent of the United Nations or a relevant 
regional body, we would be breaking international law. Perhaps, but the Security Council 
recently codified a new international norm prescribing “the responsibility to protect”. It 
commits U.N. members to decisive action, including enforcement, when peaceful measures 
fail to halt genocide or crimes against humanity…” 
Gareth Evans, the co-writer of the report “Responsibility to Protect” and the 
President of the International Crisis Group, gave the following statement on a Seminar on 
International Use of Force62:  
 
“…The problem of what exactly is to be done in a situation in which the criteria of 
legitimacy seem manifestly to be satisfied, yet the cloak of formal legality is not available 
because, for whatever reason, the Security Council, fails or refuses to authorize the relevant 
military action: in other words, what most people would now accept was the situation with 
Kosovo in 1999. As the ICISS commission expressed it, in these cases a very real dilemma 
arises as to which of two evils is the worse: the damage to international order if the 
Security Council is bypassed or in the damage to that order if human beings are slaughtered 
while the Security Council stands by. Its own response to this dilemma was not to try and 
establish some alternative basis for the legality of interventions, but to opt instead for a 
very clear political message: if an individual state or ad hoc coalition steps in, fully 
observes and respects all the necessary criteria of legitimacy, intervenes successfully, and 
is seen to have done so by world public opinion, then this is likely to have enduringly 
serious consequences for the stature and credibility of the UN itself. That is essentially 
what happened with the U.S. and NATO intervention in Kosovo, and the UN cannot afford 
to drop the ball too many times on that scale...” 
 
                                                
62 “The responsibility to protect and the use of force” by Gareth Evans on the Seminar on International Use of 
Force, World Legal Forum, The Hague, 11 December 2007 pg. 6-7 
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4.4.6 Part – conclusion 
 
Since the pillar of responsibility to react has not fulfilled the conditions regarding 
state practice and opinio juris, the pillar has not gained the status of customary international 
law.    
 
 
4.5 CRITICISM OF THE UN CHARTER ARTICLE 2(4) 
 
 
4.5.1 Introduction 
 
 In this part I will investigate if the prohibition on the use of force is considered 
absolute. There are two different angles; the first claims that the prohibition on the use of 
force has become desuetude. The other angle claims that the prohibition needs to be 
reinterpreted. The reason why I think this is relevant is due to the fact that if this is true, 
R2P will become a legitimate exception from the prohibition on the use of force. In this 
part I will address if the UN Charter Article 2(4) has become desuetude. 
 
4.5.2 Has the UN Charter Article 2(4) become desuetude? 
 
Since the late 1960s or early 1970s, two kinds of challenges63 have been launched 
against the prohibition on the use of force put down in the UN Charter Article 2(4). In the 
                                                
63 “Customary international law and the use of force” by Cannizzaro and Palchetti pg. 23 (2005) 
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first category we find arguments that the UN Charter provisions are too restrictive in that 
national leaders are not allowed to use military force when they personally perceive 
pressing moral or normative issues to which they wish to respond. The second category 
consists of arguments that the provisions of the UN Charter no longer bind because of the 
huge number of rule violations. 
Treaties64 consist of binding obligations to which parties have expressively 
consented. Opinio juris is thus not constitutive of treaties as it is of customary international 
law. Yet, the legal opinion of states and international organizations about a treaty is 
important to a number of other treaty principles: the evolution of treaty provision to rules of 
customary law and jus cogens, the elimination of a treaty provision through desuetude, the 
preemption of a treaty provision by the creation of a new, contrary customary rule and the 
modification and interpretations of treaty provisions.  
A number of prominent legal scholars are associated with the “rules are dead” 
argument. Thomas Franck may well have been the first to assert that owing to significant 
disregard of the UN Charter Article 2(4) it could no longer be considered a viable rule, 
binding on states65. Jean Combacau expressed a similar view. A more recent exponent of 
this view is Michael Glennon who took up the assertation during the Kosovo conflict. At 
that time, he argued that NATO should have the right to authorize uses of force, 
comparable to the UN Security Council. When NATO did not support the US plan to use 
force against Iraq, however, Glennon argued that:  
”…Since 1945, dozens of member states have engaged in well over 100 inter-state 
conflicts that have killed millions of people. This record of violation is legally significant. 
The international legal system is voluntary and states are bound only by rules to which they 
consent. A treaty can lose its binding effect if a sufficient number of parties engage in 
conduct that is at odds with the constraints of the treaty. The consent of United Nations 
member states to the general prohibition against the use of force, as expressed in the UN 
                                                
64 “Customary international law and the use of force” by Cannizzaro and Palchetti pg. 20 (2005) 
65 “Customary international law and the use of force” by Cannizzaro and Palchetti pg. 23 (2005) 
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Charter, has in this way been supplanted by changed intent as expressed deeds. It seems the 
UN Charter has, tragically, gone the way of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact which purported 
to outlaw war and was signed by every major belligerent in World War II…” 
Glennon’s argument66 (and that of others) does not seem to be that new rules of 
customary international law have emerged replacing the UN Charter, but rather that the UN 
Charter provisions have just evaporated through long failure to respect them. So this is not 
strictly an analysis of whether the rules on the use of force have the status of customary 
international law by reflecting general practice followed out by a sense of legal obligation. 
Rather, the analysis is whether the UN Charter has been so ignored on the use of force 
issues that its rules have passed into desuetude. Once the UN Charter rules on the use of 
force disappear through non-use, states will revert to the situation pre-Charter, to a time 
when under customary international law states were free to use force as an instrument of 
national policy. 
The conditions of desuetude67 have not been met, however, in the case of the UN 
Charter. Far from ignoring it, states regularly attempt to justify uses of force, even the 
states plainly in breach of the UN Charter, in terms of the UN Charter. All of this activity 
around the UN Charter is the opposite of ignoring it. We need hardly say more to defeat the 
desuetude argument, but it is worth adding that much of the attention states give the UN 
Charter provisions on the use of force is positive support. And that positive support is the 
key element to keeping treaty provisions viable. This is stated in the Nicaragua Case68:  
“If a state acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized provision, but 
defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the 
provision itself, then whether or not the state’s conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, 
the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the provision.” 
 
                                                
66 “Customary international law and the use of force” by Cannizzaro and Palchetti pg. 24 (2005) 
67 “Customary international law and the use of force” by Cannizzaro and Palchetti pg. 24 (2005) 
68 Nicaragua v. the United States of America, Judgment of June 27th 2008  
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4.5.3 De lege ferenda 
 
The points made by these scholars do make sense. Even though all countries in the 
world have a membership in the United Nations, many of them still violate a lot of the 
provisions put down in the UN Charter. But even though member states do not respect 
some of the UN Charter provisions, does not mean that the whole Charter has become 
obsolete. One would never say that because some citizens commit homicide, they would 
not have a law against it, because some people violate it. This applies for international law 
as well. 
 
4.6 REINTERPREATION OF THE UN CHARTER AND INVOKING MORAL 
NORMS 
 
4.6.1 Introduction 
 
In this part I will determine if it is possible to reinterpret the UN Charter Article 
2(4). 
 
4.6.2 Is it possible to reinterpret the UN Charter Article 2(4)? 
 
A different category of criticism69 focuses on a problem that challenges all law: the 
application of a general rule may result in a questionable outcome in a particular case 
judged by standards other than law compliance. A number of governments, as well as 
scholars, have argued for exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force to allow greater 
flexibility for particular desirable ends – such as promoting democracy, ending human 
                                                
69 “Customary international law and the use of force” by Cannizzaro and Palchetti pg. 25 (2005) 
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rights violations and pre-empting future attacks. The UN Charter clearly prohibits the use 
of force for these purposes without the Security Council authorization. The critics have 
used a variety of argument to justify such uses, such as re-interpreting that UN Charter to 
find a right to use force in the text, and invoking moral norms that should override the UN 
Charter, either by saying that breaching the legal norm in such cases is not really a breach 
or by saying that even though it is a breach, it should not be treated as other breaches.  
The method of reinterpretation70 has been invoked by those who want a right of 
humanitarian intervention. The scholars argue for reading the UN Charter in a certain way 
so as to find such a right among the human rights provisions. Fernando Teson was an early 
proponent of this approach. Interpreting the UN Charter through a classical approach, 
however, can not support a reading that finds a right of humanitarian intervention. The UN 
Charter Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force. The drafting history makes clear that Article 
2(4) was to be read as a broad provision – prohibiting all uses of force, hence the “or in any 
manner”. This phrase was designed to insure there were no loopholes in the prohibition on 
the use of force. The plain words of the UN Charter prohibit humanitarian intervention, 
certainly without Security Council authorization. Nor is there evidence that stats have 
successfully reinterpreted the ordinary meaning of the UN Charter. The evidence from state 
practice and opinio juris supports the ordinary meaning of the UN Charter’s terms as the 
understanding that has prevailed regarding humanitarian intervention. Although 
humanitarian is not justified or accepted as a right to use armed forces, it seems that in 
some cases it is tolerated by the international community. In the cases of Tanzania and 
India, the international community reacted consistently with the norm of non-intervention, 
but imposed no countermeasures, which suggests one way of understanding humanitarian 
intervention is not so much a right, but as illegal conduct which is tolerated by the 
international community in extreme circumstances. 
 
                                                
70 “Customary international law and the use of force” by Cannizzaro and Palchetti pg. 26-27 (2005) 
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4.6.3 De lege ferenda 
 
When the international community witness atrocities committed against an innocent 
population, it is easy to understand those states that want to end it. The problem, however, 
is that such an act undermines the UN Charter. If a national leader decides to use force 
without regard for the UN Charter, on the basis of personal moral, it takes the decision 
away from the international community that has created the rules and the institutions to act 
on its behalf. It ignores that these community-created rules have their own internal morality 
– they were created in the conviction that preservation of peace is the most important factor 
in the protecting of human rights.  
 
4.6.4 Part – conclusion 
 
 After closer analysis it is clear that the UN Charter has not become desuetude and it 
is clear that governments cannot interpret the UN Charter as they feel like. First, whenever 
a state has reached the decision to intervene in another state with armed forces, it always 
tries to get the blessing from the United Nations and especially the Security Council. A 
recent example of this is the 2003 Iraq War. The United States first wanted to get 
authorization by the Security Council, and when that failed they decided to intervene 
unilaterally. This shows that the UN Charter still dominates the international law on 
intervention. Secondly, the prohibition on the use of force is clear and unambiguous, and 
other treaties, judicial decisions and legal theory backs this up. States tries to reinterpret the 
UN Charter so it can fit to their cause, but in the end it will always be the traditional 
interpretation of the UN Charter that will prevail. 
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4.7 THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
 
4.7.1 Introduction 
 
The report “Responsibility to Protect” by the ICISS stated that71:  
 
“…The authority of the United Nations is underpinned not by coercive power, but 
by its role as the applicator of legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy acts as the connecting 
link between the exercise of authority and the recourse to power. Attempts to enforce 
authority can only be made by the legitimate agents of that authority. Collective 
intervention blessed by the United Nations is regarded as legitimate because it is duly 
authorized by a representative international body; unilateral intervention is seen as 
illegitimate because self-interested. Those who challenge or evade the authority of the UN 
as the sole legitimate guardian of international peace and security in specific instances run 
the risk of eroding its authority in general and also undermining the principle of a world 
order based on international law and universal norms…” 
 
It is evident, that an armed intervention which has the purpose to protect the people 
in another country from massive human rights violations such as genocide, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity, must have the authorization by the Security Council in order 
to be legal. This is spelt out in the report “Responsibility to Protect” by ICISS72:  
 
”…The Commission is in absolutely no doubt that there is no better or more 
appropriate body than the Security Council to deal with military intervention issues for 
human protection purpose. It is the Security Council which should be making the hard 
                                                
71 “The Responsibility to Protect” by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty pg. 
48 (2001) 
72 “The Responsibility to Protect” by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty pg. 
49 (2001) 
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decisions in the hard cases about overriding state sovereignty. And it is the Security 
Council which should be making the often even harder decisions to mobilize effective 
resources, including military resources, to rescue populations at risk when there is no 
serious opposition on sovereignty grounds. That was the overwhelming consensus we 
found in all our consultations around the world. If international consensus is ever to be 
reached about when, where, how and by whom military intervention should happen, it is 
very clear that the central role of the Security Council will have to be at the heart of that 
consensus…”  
 
I have, however, tried to find exceptions to this rule, mainly due to the Security 
Council’s passive role regarding humanitarian crisis. I therefore think it is important to 
look at the role of the Security Council and find out if the doctrine of R2P and the pillar of 
R2R have changed the way the Security Council view the use of force, and if the Security 
Council as a result will take the appropriate responsibility – to protect people from massive 
human rights violations when that occur. Since the Security Council is the body that can 
decide upon interventions, that body has a responsibility to react if grave human crisis 
occur in the international community.  
 
There are a number of questions that can reasonably be asked about the Security 
Council’s authority and credibility. The problems I am going to address in this part of the 
thesis are: the Security Council’s unrepresentative membership, the veto right of the five 
permanent member states and its unwillingness to authorize intervention for humanitarian 
purposes. There are many reasons for being dissatisfied with the role that the Security 
Council has played so far. 
 
4.7.2 The unrepresentative membership of the Security Council 
 
The first problem I am going to address is the unrepresentative membership in the 
Security Council. The Security Council consists of fifteen member states, five permanent 
member states which are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China, 
 46 
and ten rotating member states. This composition can hardly be claimed as being 
representative of the realities of the modern era because it excludes permanent membership 
to countries of major size and influence, in particular countries from Africa, Asia and Latin 
America.  
 
There is no doubt that reform of the Security Council, in particular to broaden and 
make more genuinely representative its composition, would help in building its credibility 
and authority. The United Nations has to evolve as the world has evolved, and since it has 
been over sixty years since the formation of this organization, I think it is time to change 
the composition of the Security Council. Countries such as Brazil, Germany, South-Africa, 
India and Japan could be candidates for permanent membership of the Security Council.  
 
4.7.3 The veto right of the five permanent countries 
 
An issue which I cannot avoid addressing is that of the veto power enjoyed by the 
five permanent member states. I believe that the use of the veto, or threat of its use, is the 
principal obstacle to effective international action in cases where quick and decisive action 
is needed to stop or avert a significant humanitarian crisis. It is alarming that one veto can 
override the rest of humanity on matters of grave humanitarian concern.  
 
A recent example of this regards to the conflict in Sudan. It was impossible for the 
Security Council to decide upon the matter due to China’s veto. As we all know, China has 
interests in Sudan and if they agreed upon an intervention in Sudan, China would loose its 
biggest import of oil. This is a good example to show how bias the veto right is. The five 
permanent member states will most likely act in their own interest and thus will grave 
human crisis not be addressed. The report “Responsibility to Protect” by the ICISS73 
suggested that:  
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“…there be agreed by the Permanent Five a “code of conduct” for the use of the 
veto with respect to actions that are needed to stop or avert a significant humanitarian 
crisis. The idea essentially is that a permanent member, in matters where its vital national 
interests were not claimed to be involved, would not use its veto to obstruct the passage of 
what would otherwise be a majority resolution. The expression “constructive abstention” 
has been used in this context in the past. It is unrealistic to imagine any amendment of the 
Charter happening any time soon so far as the veto power and its distribution are 
concerned. But the adoption by the permanent members of a more formal, mutually agreed 
practice to govern these situations in the future would be a very healthy development…” 
 
 I agree upon such a conduct. Ideally no member states should have a veto right, but 
since that change is going to be very difficult to make, I think a code of conduct when it 
comes to atrocities is a good way to make a change. 
 
4.7.4 The responsibility of the Security Council 
 
While the Council has from time to time demonstrated a commitment and a 
capacity to fulfill this responsibility, too often it has fallen short of its responsibilities, or 
failed to live up to expectations. Sometimes this has been the result of a sheer lack of 
interest on the part of the five permanent members. Sometimes it has been because of 
anxiety about how a particular commitment would play in domestic politics. Often in the 
past, it has been the result of disagreements among the five permanent members on what if 
any action should be taken. Increasingly, it has resulted from a reluctance on the part of 
some key members to bear the burdens – especially the financial and personnel burdens – 
of international action. 
 
It is especially important that every effort be made to encourage the Security 
Council to exercise – and not abdicate – its responsibility to protect. This means, as the UN 
Charter Article 24 requires, prompt and effective engagement by the Council when matters 
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of international peace and security are directly at issue. And it means clear and responsible 
leadership by the Council especially when significant loss of human life is occurring or is 
threatened, even though there may be no direct or imminent threat to international peace 
and security in the strict sense. 
 
Hopefully the Security Council will change the way they work regarding 
humanitarian crisis otherwise other states make take coercive action to stop it. The 
Secretary-General’s warned that:  
 
“…If the collective conscience of humanity … cannot find in the United Nations its 
greatest tribune, there is a grave danger that it will look elsewhere for peace and for 
justice…”  
 
If the Council, and the five permanent members in particular, fail to make the 
Council relevant to the critical issues of the day then they can only expect that the Council 
will diminish in significance, stature and authority. 
5 CONCLUSION 
 
 
I started off this thesis by asking if the doctrine of R2P and the pillar of R2R have lead 
to a change in how the international community views the use of force against another 
country to protect its citizens from massive human rights violations such as genocide, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In that aspect I wanted to find the answer to 
four different sets of problems.  
The first problem I examined was if the pillar of “responsibility to react” had become 
customary international law. After an analysis of state practice and opinio juris by some 
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governments, the conclusion was that neither of the conditions were fulfilled and thus the 
pillar of “responsibility to react” has not become customary international law.  
The second problem I investigated was if the UN Charter Article 2 (4) had become 
desuetude. Even though there were some legal scholars that suggested that the UN 
Charter’s prohibition on the use of force had become desuetude, it did not change the fact 
that an overwhelming amount of governments together with the International Court of 
Justice claimed otherwise. The UN Charter Article 2 (4) has not become desuetude. 
 The third problem that I tried to find an answer to was if it was possible to 
reinterpret the UN Charter Article 2 (4). After studying the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, it is clear that such a reinterpretation cannot take place. The treaty 
provision regarding the prohibition on the use of force is leaves no room for the right to 
unilateral intervention for human protection purposes. 
The fourth problem was more a political issue than a legal issue. I wanted to find 
out if the pillar of “responsibility to react” had changed the way the Security Council view 
the prohibition on the use of force. Some decades ago there was no legal basis for an 
intervention for human protection purposes. It was considered unlawful, and the Security 
Council would not have authorized it. However, recently this has changed dramatically. 
The Security Council has, as a result of the report “Responsibility to Protect” changed in 
the matter of using force for human protection purposes. They have authorized the use of 
force to protect the civilians in Darfur, and they are also starting to discuss the situation in 
Burma, and what they can do to protect the civilians there.   
After a thorough analysis of the pillar of responsibility to react and the legal material 
on this issue, the conclusion is that an armed intervention in another state to protect its 
people from massive human rights violations such as genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity has to have the authorization of the Security Council. Right now there is 
no legal basis for a unilateral intervention for human protection purposes if the Security 
Council fails to act.  
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6 DE LEGE FERENDA 
 
 
We live in a world where violence is a daily occurrence. There are conflicts and 
wars at any given time and the violence does not seem to end even though the world has 
become “smaller” and more “civilized”. Atrocities such as genocide, ethnic cleansing or 
crimes against humanity should not even happen in our time due to all our regulations, but 
unfortunately they do. There are several problems regarding the right to unilateral 
intervention to end human suffering. 
 
 I believe that an armed intervention authorized by the Security Council would be 
thoroughly investigated and less bias than a unilateral intervention. It is important that the 
international community follows international law. If, however, the international 
community witness atrocities such as genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity on a gross scale, and the Security Council is unable to act due to different 
reasons, I believe that other states can intervene to end the suffering. The reason why I do 
not want an absolute prohibition on the use of force is due to experiences in the past. There 
have been some horrifying cases of genocide, Rwanda is probably the best example of such 
a genocide, where the Security Council obviously should have acted but did not act. In 
those situations, the international community should be able to act even though the Security 
Council has not authorized the intervention. With that said, I do not want an intervention 
for whatever humanitarian reason. This may come across as harsh; it is impossible to weigh 
human lives because every life is worth the same, but I believe that states can only 
intervene where the human rights breaches are grossest. This is due to the fact that an 
armed intervention will also take lives, and should therefore be used as a last resort when 
all other means have been tries. 
 
Even though I agree upon the right of unilateral interventions for human protection 
purposes where the Security Council fails to act, there are several problems regarding such 
a right. The first problem is that there are so many conflicts and wars going on in the world 
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at any given time, that it would be impossible to address all of them. What should states do 
when they witness many cases of massive human rights breaches? Should they intervene in 
all conflicts or wars and thus be consistent, or should they be more selective and intervene 
where the human rights breaches are the grossest? If states were consistent regarding 
unilateral intervention for human rights purposes, I would be more inclined to agree upon 
such a principle. But, such consistency would, however, never be practiced in real life. On 
the contrary, it seems that some states intervene only for their own selfish reasons and not 
for the greater good of society. Some examples may be in order. Why has a unilateral 
intervention in Rwanda never taken place? I personally believe that it was due to the fact 
that Rwanda was of no significance to the powerful states, and such they did not want to 
spend money and risk soldier’s lives to restore peace. The result is that 1.000.000 million 
individuals were killed. On the other hand, the ethnic cleansing that went on in Kosovo was 
obviously much more important to end, and not to downplay what happened there, but this 
conflict was not even close to what was going on in Rwanda. By this example it is clear 
that if unilateral intervention was allowed, states would most likely use it for their own 
good. If I was to agree upon the right of a unilateral intervention without the authority of 
the Security Council, I need to know that all human rights breaches would be stopped, not 
just a few selected ones.  
 
So, if the Security Council does not agree on a multilateral intervention due to veto 
or something else, should states just watch silently when people are being slaughtered? 
This clearly is against all human empathy. I do not believe that anyone wants to witness 
another World War II. I am, however, concerned that if the right of unilateral intervention 
to stop human suffering would be allowed, powerful states such as the United States and 
the United Kingdom would abuse this right and take the law into their own hands. Powerful 
states might conceal the real reason for intervention by hiding behind the right of unilateral 
intervention to stop human suffering. There are unfortunately many examples of this kind. 
One example is the Clinton-doctrine. Clinton stated that if the Security Council did not act 
when a country was facing massive human rights violations, other states have the right to 
intervene and stop the human suffering. After the 1999 Kosovo War he claimed that this 
 52 
had been a true humanitarian intervention that went well. I can see his point. The NATO 
forces managed to stop the human suffering, and the former Yugoslavia is today a stabile 
place consisting of different autonomous countries compared to what it was 10 years ago. I 
am however doubtful to the idea of a right of unilateral intervention without authorization 
from the Security Council. The reason behind my argument is that it seems that the 
interventions that countries tend to make, are not necessarily for the right reasons. There 
has been much bigger crisis than the 1999 Kosovo War. If the United States was so eager 
to stop human suffering why do they support regimes that clearly breach human rights? For 
me this shows that the interventions usually are made for selfish reasons not for the people 
in the country.  
 
A third problem is the paradox, and the paradox is that to end human suffering more 
human suffering needs to take place. It is impossible for an intervening force to not kill 
civilians and it is impossible to know the aftermath of an intervention. It is not only human 
damage that takes place, but often total destruction of infrastructure, government 
institutions and private homes. With that said, in order for me to agree upon an armed 
intervention to stop human suffering, the conflict or war needs to be of such significance 
that the intervention would be less of a burden that the conflict itself. In other words, there 
has to be such gross human rights violations that an armed intervention would not change 
the outcome of the conflict. Such an example is the Rwandan genocide in 1994. In less than 
4 months 1.000.000 tutsies and moderate hutus were slaughtered and the whole world 
watched the butchering taking place. If it was not for the tutsi rebel army’s determination to 
end it, even more individuals would be slaughtered. We should have learned after World 
War II, that there are some conflicts that we are morally obliged to end. We do not want 
another World War. 
 
Even though there are several problems regarding the right of unilateral intervention 
for human protection purposes I still stand by my decision to agree upon such a principle. 
There has to be some kind of security if the Security Council fails to address a gross 
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humanitarian crisis. That security should be a right to intervene unilaterally to protect 
people from genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
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